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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a behavioural approach to determine the extent to which the
consumer/citizen distinction aﬀects interpretations of monetary values. We perform a ﬁeld
experiment dealing with air pollution, where some (randomly selected) subjects are given the
opportunity to behave politically by signing a petition for environmental protection prior to
stating their private preferences in a standard contingent valuation exercise. We show that
the petition has the potential to inﬂuence respondents' willingness to pay and that whether
the eﬀect is negative or positive depends on the degree of (dis)similarity between the petition
and the scenario in which willingness to pay are elicited. We interpret the results using the
theory of commitment borrowed from social psychology.
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1 Introduction
From the outset, the interpretation of respondents' behaviour in CV question-
naires has provoked debate. In particular, some authors have questioned the
interpretation of respondents as consumers, proposing instead a more political
interpretation of respondents as citizens (Nyborg 2000; Lewinson-Zamir 1998;
Blamey et al. 1995). As citizens, the assumption is that respondents express
political attitudes rather than expressing monetary values in line with consumer
surplus (Orr 2007; Blamey 1998). This is primarily because attitudes do not
correspond to people's consumer surplus (Kahneman and Sugden 2005). It has
also been argued, for example, that respondents may adopt diﬀerent 'roles' and
that if they are in their citizen role, they may consider overall social welfare
instead of their own needs or wants (Sagoﬀ 1988). If this is the case, it would of
course cast doubt on the use of respondents' answers in CV surveys in standard
cost-beneﬁt analysis (Nyborg 2000).
The question is how to operationalize the distinction between respondents in
CV surveys as consumers and as citizens. One way of doing this is to adopt an
ex-post approach that looks at determinants of observed behaviour, by corre-
lating willingness to pay (WTP) values with appropriate attitudinal questions
(Nunes and Schokkaert 2003). In this paper, however, we adopt an ex-ante and
behavioural approach in the spirit of Boyce et al. (1992) that relies on com-
mitment theory borrowed from social psychology (Kiesler 1971). Experiments
on the social psychology of commitment have shown that when people agree
to perform an initial action, even when it appears to be innocuous, this can
have strong attitudinal and behavioural consequences (Kiesler and Sakumura
1966; Joule and Beauvois 1998). Our experiment follows this route in that some
(randomly selected) subjects are given the choice to behave politically prior to
stating their private preferences in a CV exercise.1 We call subjects who agree
to perform the political action committed citizens and we compare their be-
haviour to that of a control group of respondents who merely answer the CV
questionnaire directly.
Our ﬁeld experiment focuses on a speciﬁc environmental issue: air pollution.
First, some subjects are given the opportunity to sign a petition calling on (the
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then) future candidates in the French 2007 presidential election, to be held six
months later, to take an oﬃcial stand (regarding their program and respective
commitment) on environmental preservation. Second, all subjects are asked
to respond to a CV questionnaire aimed at eliciting willingness to pay for a
reduction in air pollution. Our sample is therefore composed of two groups of
subjects: one asked to sign a petition before performing the CV exercise and
one performing this exercise directly.
We investigate the articulation between political behaviour and stated will-
ingness to pay by examining values under three typical scenarios of the CV
literature on air pollution: a new drug that prevents adverse health eﬀects of
air pollution exposure for the respondent alone (Alberini et al. 2004; Krupnick
et al. 2002), moving the whole household to an already less polluted city (Vis-
cusi et al. 1988; Aprahamian et al. 2007) and new regulations on air pollution
that will potentially increase market prices (Desaigues et al. 2007). One feature
of these scenarios is they diﬀer in scope. This means that beneﬁts range from
the individual (drug scenario) to the family level (move scenario) and up to the
society level (regulation scenario). A second feature is that the drug scenario
does not imply any particular measure to protect the environment whereas the
two other scenarios do. The move scenario implies that local action has al-
ready been taken with the result that one of the locations has less air pollution.
The regulation scenario presupposes national, or even international, measures
to protect the environment.
The experiment took place over three days in October 2006 in the council
chamber of Regional Council in the city of Marseilles which is equipped for
electronic voting. It involved more than four hundred subjects under six sets
of experimental conditions. Our results are as follows. First, more than eighty
percent of subjects agreed to sign the petition when it was presented to them.
Second, the petition had a signiﬁcant, although varying, impact on subjects'
willingness to pay. Econometric analysis shows that subjects who were oﬀered
the petition were more likely to pay more in the move and regulation scenarios.
In the drug scenario, subjects were less willing to pay when they had been
oﬀered the petition prior to the valuation exercise.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section, we deﬁne our ex-
perimental hypotheses based on the social psychology of commitment. In the
second section, we give a detailed description of the experimental design. The
third section provides information on the sample characteristics and presents
the empirical results. In the ﬁnal section, we discuss the results and draw
conclusions.
2 Three experimental hypotheses
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that subjects who have previously performed a political
act, that is, who have signed the petition, will be willing to pay more for a good
or a policy relevant to the protection of the environment than subjects who
were not asked to sign the petition in the ﬁrst place. Our second hypothesis
is that subjects who have signed the petition will state a lower WTP in the
drug scenario than subjects who have not been oﬀered the petition. These two
hypotheses can be understood in the light of the theory of commitment (Kiesler
1971; Joule and Beauvois 1998), whereby commitment means the pledging or
binding of the individual to behavioural acts (Kiesler and Sakumura 1966, p.
349). Foot-in-the-door experiments are situations that typically produce this
kind of commitment (Joule et al. 2007), by asking subjects to comply with an
initial request and later on making a second request which is thematically in
line with the initial request. In commitment theory in general, a ﬁrst request
acts as a commitment device that puts people in a certain mindframe regarding
the action that is going to follow (Joule and Beauvois 1998). That is, when they
are asked to comply with the second request, subjects may consider themselves
as being the kind of person [...] who does this sort of things (Freedman and
Fraser 1966, p.101)  in our case, a citizen who is concerned about environmental
protection  because they have already complied with the initial request.2 Be-
ing this kind of person means that they are committed to a certain cause and
hence are more likely to comply with the second request. Foot-in-the-door ex-
periments have shown that subjects agree to a second request much more easily
if they have already agreed to an initial request of a similar kind (see Freedman
and Fraser 1966 for the original foot-in-the-door experiments,3 Burger 1999 and
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Joule and Beauvois 1998 for reviews, and Katzev and Wang 1994 and Wang
and Katzev 1990 for applications to the environment).
In our experiment, we ask some subjects to sign a petition in favour of en-
vironmental protection and later on we ask subjects for their WTP on the
one hand for living in a less polluted city (move) or for the implementation
of new rules and laws against air pollution (regulation) and on the other hand
for a drug (drug) that does not imply any protection of the environment but
only reduces the eﬀects of air pollution exposure on individual health. Because,
[c]ommitment in the guise of signing a petition [has] a powerful eﬀect on the ex-
pression of attitude, leading to a more extreme attitude (Kiesler, 1971, p. 79),
we expect higher WTP values in the move and regulation scenarios (reﬂecting
a more extreme attitude to environmental protection) but lower WTP values
in the drug scenario, because the latter does not imply better protection of the
environment. Indeed, taking the drug could even be taken to mean not protect-
ing the environment, which is incompatible with being a citizen committed to
environmental protection.
Our third hypothesis is that the impact of signing the petition on WTP
should be diﬀerent in the move and regulation scenarios. More precisely, the
impact of the petition should be stronger in the regulation scenario and weaker
in the move scenario. The foot-in-the-door literature shows that compliance
with the second request increases with similarity to the initial request (Burger
1999; Joule and Beauvois 1998; Freedman and Fraser 1966). Similarity here
means the same level of identiﬁcation for the ﬁrst and second request (Joule and
Beauvois 1998). For example, in their second experiment, Freedman and Fraser
(1966) consider initial requests which involve either putting a small sign for
safe driving or keeping California beautiful on their window. In the second
request, they ask subjects to install in front of their door a very large sign which
says Drive carefully. The initial request related to safe driving is said to
have a higher degree of similarity with the second request. In our experiment,
subjects are given the opportunity to sign a petition concerning nationwide
environmental protection. This ﬁrst act is a political commitment inducing
a nationwide identiﬁcation level of environmental protection. The move and
regulation scenarios, however, induce diﬀerent levels of identiﬁcation regarding
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environmental protection. The move scenario implies a lower eﬀect since only
some local protective measures have been implemented. The regulation scenario
implies a higher level because it presupposes national, or even international,
measures to protect the environment and hence presents the highest degree
of similarity with the petition. We therefore expect the highest eﬀect in this
particular scenario.
3 Experimental design
The experiment is a 2× 3 design aimed at investigating the interplay between
a speciﬁc political act and stated willingness to pay (WTP) for air quality
improvements. Under the experimental conditions, subjects are either oﬀered
a petition before the valuation exercise or not, and are presented with three
diﬀerent scenarios.
Let us ﬁrst describe the three scenarios. The empirical aim of the ﬁeld ex-
periment was to elicit willingness-to-pay for a decrease in air pollution. To this
end, we considered three typical scenarios from the CV literature devoted to
the valuation of air pollution eﬀects. In the ﬁrst scenario, called Drug scenario,
we adopted the methodology proposed by Alberini et al. (2004) and Krupnick
et al. (2002). The scenario presented subjects with a new drug that has to
be taken on a monthly basis. This drug would reduce, by half, the long-term
health eﬀects of air pollution exposure.4 The direct beneﬁts of this new drug
are therefore essentially at the individual level5 and air pollution itself is not
reduced (see Appendix A for the scenario). The second scenario, called Move
scenario (Viscusi et al. 1988; Aprahamian et al. 2007), is a choice of moving
with the subject's household to one of two cities which have exactly the same
characteristics (city size, housing, weather, public services etc.) apart from the
cost of living and the level of air pollution.6 By moving to a less polluted place,
the subject was oﬀered the opportunity to improve air quality for him/herself
and other members of his/her household (see Appendix B for the scenario). We
borrowed the third scenario, called Regulation scenario, from the New Energy
Externalities Developments for Sustainability project (NEEDS) supported by
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the European Commission (Desaigues et al. 2007). This scenario involves new
rules and laws to be applied to polluting ﬁrms and activities (industries, trans-
port, etc.). Since the introduction of these new laws and rules would increase
the cost of living, through market prices, the subject is asked to state the maxi-
mum s/he would be willing to pay each month to implement this policy.7 In this
scenario, not only the subject and his/her family but also the whole community
would beneﬁt from the implementation of this new policy (see Appendix C for
the scenario). It is worth noting that the changes in air pollution proposed in
each scenario were identical: air pollution health eﬀects reduced by half with
the same situation of reference.
Respondents were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers and
on local TV news - the survey was described as being about quality of life.
Each participant was paid AC 20 (about US $26) in gift vouchers. Respondents
were unaware of the exact topic of the survey prior to the experiment. The
experiment was conducted in the Regional Council council chamber. The vot-
ing room is equipped with an electronic voting system that allows some of the
information to be collected in real time from up to 120 participants and en-
sure that experiments are carried out in the same manner in each session. On
the ﬁrst day, three sessions were implemented, each devoted to one particular
scenario (scenarios were drawn randomly). On the second day, three sessions
were also implemented in the same way but, prior to the CV experiment itself,
subjects were asked to sign a petition.8 The petition asked future candidates
in the 2007 presidential election to take an oﬃcial stand concerning environ-
mental preservation.9 Three students from the Department of Psychology, who
presented themselves as apolitical students, asked subjects to sign the petition
before entering the voting room. The students were given a script to learn by
heart. The script was therefore the same each time they presented the petition
to subjects (see appendix D for a full translation). To correlate the information
on subjects' willingness to sign the petition with their respective answers in the
CV experiment, we assigned to each subject a number corresponding to their
voting seat when they registered. Two other experimenters noted the number
worn on the subject's chest, and whether or not s/he signed the petition (CV
answers were also identiﬁed using this number).10 Our design thus allowed us
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to keep track of subjects throughout the experimental procedure.
The CV experiment itself was divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part of the
experiment contained a self-administered survey with questions on the socio-
economic background of the respondent and knowledge of air pollution. There-
after the scenario was presented to respondents. Their willingness to pay regard-
ing air pollution was elicited using a sequential procedure. In this procedure,
scientiﬁc information on the eﬀects of air pollution11 and information on other
subjects' willingness to pay (gathered through the electronic voting system) was
progressively introduced. Finally, subjects were asked about their willingness
to pay for a reduction in the eﬀects of air pollution in an open-ended question
at the end of the sequential procedure (see Chanel et al. 2006 for a complete
description of the elicitation procedure). In the present article, we focus on
the answer to the ﬁnal open-ended elicitation question. Follow-up questions
allowing protest responses to be identiﬁed were also provided at the end of the
experiment.
The CV experiment provides us with two diﬀerent tracks to investigate the
impact of the political action taken through the petition. The ﬁrst track is
whether exposure to the petition aﬀects the likelihood of protest responses, and
if so, whether this varies with the scenario. The second track is whether taking
a political action before the valuation exercise aﬀects willingness to pay.
4 Results
The experiment was carried out in October 2006 with a total number of 441 par-
ticipants for the six sessions. As registration via the Public Economics Institute
website or phoneline was not mandatory, the total number of participants in
each session varies (see Table 1 for the number of subjects in each session and in
Appendix E for the sample means and standard deviations of key socioeconomic
variables).
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Table 1: Summary statistics by treatment condition and scenario (N = 441)
Scenario Standard Petition Both
Drug ] of respondents 49 117 (82.9% signatures) 166
] of protests (rate) 8 (16%) 20 (17%) 28 (16.9%)
Mean WTP (sd) AC30.22 (8.18) AC16.62 (1.67) AC23.01
Mean WTP/Income 3.77 % 1.51 % 2.26 %
Move ] of respondents 86 63 (84.1% signatures) 149
] of protests (rate) 3 (3.5%) 0 (0%) 3 (2.0%)
Mean WTP AC94.76 (12.64) AC72.62 (9.25) AC83.78
Mean WTP/Income 8.48 % 8.98 % 8.87 %
Regulation ] of respondents 63 63 (79.3% signatures) 126
] of protests (rate) 2 (3.2%) 1 (1.6%) 3 (2.4%)
Mean WTP AC24.66 (3.58) AC36.85 (5.03) AC27.13
Mean WTP/Income 2.73 % 6.22 % 4.63 %
All scenarios ] of respondents 198 243 (82.3% signatures) 441
] of protests (rate) 13 (6.5%) 21 (8.6%) 34 (7.8%)
Mean WTP (sd) AC57.34 (6.54) AC38.16 (3.42) AC46.88
Mean WTP/Income 4.82 % 5.56 % 5.30 %
4.1 Unconditional petition eﬀect
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the experiment. A large proportion
of respondents agreed to sign the petition asking the future candidates to take
an oﬃcial stand in their program regarding environmental preservation: 82.3%.
This is not surprising given that, when the experiment took place, this issue
was receiving a lot of attention in the French media. Moreover, numerous
studies in social psychology show that when people are given the opportunity
to perform a small inexpensive act (in our case, signing a petition related to a
current issue and involving no monetary cost), many people freely choose to do
so (Katzev and Wang 1994; Pallack et al. 1980; Wang and Katzev 1990; Joule
and Beauvois 1998; Girandola and Roussiau 2003). There are no signiﬁcant
statistical diﬀerences in signature rate between the diﬀerent scenarios (p-values
of two-sample tests for equality of proportions range from 0.64 to 0.99).
Protest responses correspond to respondents expressing null WTP and giv-
ing a reason in closed-ended debrieﬁng questions or open comments that can
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be described as protests.12 The number of protests diﬀers between the drug
scenario and the move and regulation scenarios (p-values lower than 0.0001 for
both comparisons). It is markedly higher for the former, regardless of whether
the petition has previously been oﬀered (16.9% vs 2.0% for move and 2.4%
for regulation on average). There is also a small but non-signiﬁcant decrease
in protest responses when the petition has been oﬀered, for the move and
regulation scenarios.
Let us now consider the WTP statistics.13 Table 1 shows ﬁrst that mean
WTP diﬀers depending on which scenario has been implemented. The mean
WTP obtained in the move scenario, taking both with and without petition
responses together(AC83.78), is signiﬁcantly and substantially higher than in the
drug (AC23.01 with p < 0.0001) and the regulation (AC27.13 with p < 0.0001)
scenarios. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between mean WTP of the drug
or regulation scenarios (p = 0.20614). Second, the impact of the petition on
mean WTP diﬀers according to the scenario evaluated in the session. The
impact of the petition on mean WTP is negative in the drug (p = 0.043) and
move (p = 0.092) scenarios, whereas it is positive in the regulation scenario
(p = 0.034). However, such signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mean WTP could be due
to the heterogeneity of respondents between each session. One primary source
of heterogeneity in respondents' WTP is income. Table 1 also provides mean
WTP divided by income to account for potential heterogeneity. Results show
that the diﬀerences in WTP induced by the petition also apply to the drug
(3.77% vs. 1.51% - p = .054) and regulation (2.73% vs. 6.22% - p = .038)
scenarios whereas the impact of the petition on the ratio of WTP over income
in the move scenario is not signiﬁcant (8.48% vs. 8.98% p = .204).
4.2 Conditional petition eﬀect
We have so far only considered diﬀerences in mean WTP or taken into account
respondents' income when analysing diﬀerences in mean. Conﬁrmation that the
results still hold when overall potential heterogeneity of respondents is taken
into account is provided by regressing explanatory variables as well as experi-
mental condition variables on the logarithm of WTP both on the subsample of
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Table 2: Semi-logarithmic WTP Model (N=341)
Variable
Parameter
(p-value)
Estimate
Subject's characteristics
Constant term .4632 (0.521)
Male -.0585 (0.577)
log(Age) .0129 (0.948)
Bac .2545 (0.041)??
log(NPers) .1287 (0.200)
log(Income) .2055 (0.004)???
LiveMars -.2042 (0.091)?
Owner .0944 (0.423)
PrivHealthIns .3419 (0.016)??
GoodQualiMars -.3067 (0.081)?
KnowAir -.0418 (0.745)
KnowAtmo .0328 (0.818)
KnowAirmaraix -.1966 (0.115)
NevSortWaste -.2969 (0.013)??
Hab .0803 (0.428)
FreshAir .2785 (0.048)??
Smoker .0768 (0.637)
Goodhealth .2392 (0.036)??
Scenario eﬀects
Move 1.1563 (0.000)???
Regulation .2639 (0.203)
Petition eﬀects
Petition × Drug -.2890 (0.168)
Petition × Move .1773 (0.316)
Petition × Regulation .3399 (0.035) ??
Wald joint nullity test: p < 0.0001
??? if p-value<0.01, ?? if p-value<0.05 and ? if p-value<0.1
respondents who signed the petition and on those who only answered the CV
questionnaire.15 Table 2 contains the estimation results (the ﬁrst column con-
tains the parameter estimates and the second column contains the associated
p-values). The set of covariates is left relatively large to avoid misspeciﬁcation
biases.
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Figure 1: Percentage changes in WTP values
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WTP in the Drug scenario
Drug Regulation Move
-26 7?
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Scenario eﬀect
Petition eﬀect
Signiﬁcant eﬀect?
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Note. Percentage changes are derived from the econometric model and have
to be read as marginal changes. That is, the WTP elicited in the Drug
scenario is the referent for scenario eﬀects and the WTP elicited without the
petition in each scenario is the referent for petition eﬀects.
Regressing logarithm of WTP on the various explanatory variables gave
the following results. In particular, the logarithm of income is highly sig-
niﬁcant, indicating that the higher the income, the higher the WTP. This is
reassuring (see Hausman 1993 for a discussion on this issue) and provides ev-
idence of the validity of the stated preference experiment (which Bishop and
Woodward 1995 deﬁned as theoretical construct validity). Having Senior High
School Education level (Bac), Having a complementary private health insur-
ance (PrivHealthIns), Going to the countryside regularly to breath pure air
(FreshAir) and Declaring good or very good health (GoodHealth) have a pos-
itive impact on WTP. Living in Marseilles (LiveMars), Declaring that air
quality in Marseilles is good (GoodQualiMars) and Never sorting waste for re-
cycling (NevSortWaste) have a negative impact on WTP values. Interestingly,
the latter is also connected to social awareness.
We now describe the eﬀect of the scenarios on WTP values (referent is
12
the drug scenario). Econometric results conﬁrm the unconditional mean tests:
WTP values elicited in the move scenario are higher than those elicited in the
drug scenario (p < 0.001). WTP values elicited in the regulation scenario are
higher, but not signiﬁcantly, than those elicited in the drug scenario (p = .203).
The percentage changes in WTP values induced by the move and regulation
scenarios with respect to WTP elicited in the drug scenario (referent) are pre-
sented in Figure 1.16 In particular, it shows that WTP elicited in the move
scenario are in average 210.6% higher than those elicited in the drug scenario.
Three diﬀerent dummies are introduced in the WTP equation to investigate
the eﬀect of signing the petition on WTP values  one for each scenario. The
results are as follows. The petition has a negative eﬀect on WTP values elicited
in the drug scenario: a one-sided test rejects non-negativity with p = .084. The
petition has no signiﬁcant eﬀect in the move scenario (p = .316), either positive
or negative. The impact of the petition in the regulation scenario is positive
and signiﬁcant: a one-sided test strongly rejects non-positivity of the eﬀect with
p=.017. The percentage changes in WTP values induced by the petition in the
drug, move and regulation scenarios are presented in Figure 1 and are -26.72%,
17.55% and 38.69% respectively.
5 Discussion
In this ﬁeld experiment, we shed new light on the consumer/citizen distinction
often used in the literature to explain respondents' answers in CV surveys.
We do so by giving respondents the opportunity to behave politically  by
signing a petition about protection of the environment  prior to a standard CV
questionnaire dealing with air pollution using three diﬀerent scenarios. Inspired
by social psychology research, we argue that signing the petition is likely to
induce an attitude more oriented toward environmental protection by turning
subjects into citizens concerned with environmental protection. Accordingly, we
suggest that signing the petition should have a positive impact on willingness to
pay values in the regulation and move scenarios (ﬁrst hypothesis) but a negative
one in the drug scenario. This is because the drug scenario does not protect
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the environment in any strict sense and is therefore incompatible with being a
citizen committed to environmental protection (second hypothesis). Moreover,
the impact of signing the petition should be greater in the regulation scenario
than in the move scenario because the regulation scenario is much more closely
related to the petition (third hypothesis).
Having presented in the previous section a number of results, via uncondi-
tional tests and econometrics, we will now comment on them further, highlight-
ing certain results. First, there is a low number of protest responses in our
sample (7.8% for the whole sample). This result is in line with what Chanel
et al. (2006) found using a similar valuation procedure also dealing with air
pollution and based on the same referent population. The petition has no sig-
niﬁcant impact on the protest responses in our sample, whatever the scenario
considered. The petition is therefore not a determinant of respondents' agreeing
to participate in the valuation exercise. Since up to ninety percent of subjects
agreed to pay that control groups without petition, it would have been sur-
prising to ﬁnd that the petition had an impact on protest responses. Second,
committed citizens, that is, subjects who signed the petition, are more likely to
pay more in the move and regulation scenarios (although the eﬀect is not signif-
icant in the move scenario). Our ﬁrst hypothesis is therefore partly supported
by our sample. The eﬀect of the petition on willingness to pay values elicited
in the drug scenario is negative, therefore in accordance with our second hy-
pothesis. The strongest positive eﬀect of the petition is found in the regulation
scenario and this supports our third hypothesis.
How do our results relate to previous ﬁndings? Experimental studies show
that invoking moral values or responsibility indeed increases individuals' will-
ingness to pay. For instance, Boyce et al. (1992) induce a moral dimension
in a valuation experiment by destroying unsold goods (small Norfolk Island
pine trees). If the subject submits a bid to purchase the tree lower than the
selling price (unknown by the subject when s/he submits his/er bid), the pine
tree is killed by the experimenter. They show that subjects endowed with
a moral responsability, that is in the 'kill' experimental condition, pay more
than in the 'no-kill' condition (where unsold goods are not destroyed). In a
paired comparison study, Clarke et al. (1999) show that when the decision is
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on the sole responsibility of the subject17 the values obtained for environmental
public goods are higher as compared to a situation where the decision is shared
between subjects. This is what we, too, obtain in the move and regulation sce-
narios. Our experimental ﬁndings, as well as previous ﬁndings, are compatible
with the view that the respondent adopts a social welfare perspective when s/he
acts as a citizen (rather than considering his/er own private interest only when
s/he acts as a consumer). Such a respondent will have a higher willingness to
pay such as in Nyborg (2000)'s model because s/he cares about the welfare of
others when s/he acts as a citizen.
Results however diﬀer for the drug scenario, where subjects who have signed
the petition tend to express lower willingness to pay values. This behavior
cannot be explained by considering that subjects who act as citizen adopt a
social welfare perspective because welfare of other members of the society is
not considered in this scenario (remember that the drug scenario involves only
personal health beneﬁts). We rather argue, based on the theory of commit-
ment borrowed from social psychology, that the petition in our experiment has
induced a commitment to environmental preservation. Taking the drug would
mean decreasing the health eﬀects of air pollution but not protecting the envi-
ronment, and this is incompatible with being a citizen who is concerned about
environmental protection. This incompatibility between the drug scenario and
the attitudes of respondents as citizens would explain the decrease in stated
willingness to pay.
6 Conclusion
Does the consumer/citizen distinction matter in stated preferences surveys?
First, our results suggest that respondents would give a diﬀerent answer de-
pending on whether they reason from a consumer or citizen perpective. Second,
the sign and the size of the eﬀect on stated willingness to pay of being a citizen
rather than a consumer depend on the (in)compatibility and the degree of simi-
larity between attitudes as a citizen and the hypothetical scenario implemented
in the survey.
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What are the consequences of these ﬁndings for the use of stated preferences
methods in public decision making? If cost-beneﬁt analysis is interpreted as a
market simulation, practionners of CV would favour the consumer perspective
(Sugden 2005). However, our results indicate that respondents may adopt a
citizen perspective even in a typical consumer perspective scenario, such as in
the drug scenario in our study. The hypothetical scenario alone may there-
fore not guarantee that respondents answer as consumers to the willingness to
pay question. Hence, one may want to identify respondents who act as citi-
zens. To this end, the real meaning of monetary values can be analysed by
using attitude questions that can be correlated to willingness to pay values (see
for instance Blamey, Common, and Quiggin 1995; Blamey 1998; Nunes and
Schokkaert 2003). We argue that questions which investigate past behaviour of
respondents as citizens (such as belonging to an environmental association or
to a union, or having signed a petition,...) should also systematically be added
to the analysis.
How do we then account for willingness to pay of respondents acting as cit-
izens? One the one hand, one may remove these answers from the analysis
because adding personal and social values is like adding apples and oranges
(Nyborg 2000, p.319). Another alternative would be to argue that what matters
is the willingness to pay at the moment of decision (Sugden 2007). To follow
this route, consider a person who enters a furniture shop to have a look around
but with no clear intention to buy anything right now. When s/he enters, the
salesman oﬀers him/er a coﬀee and suggests s/he may sit on a sofa s/he was
looking at. The person accepts the coﬀee and sits down on the sofa. Research
in social psychology evoked sooner in this paper explains that the invitation
of the salesman is a typical foot-in-the-door technique (of which the salesman
may be aware or not). This technique dramatically increases the probability
that the person eﬀectively buys the sofa. Proponents of willingness to pay at
the moment of decision approach would certainly consider that this purchase is
a valid economic decision and it is this purchase that should be taken into ac-
count if the government were to consider subsidizing national sofa production.18
However, if this is accepted, then so should the idea that the willingness to pay
of our committed citizens can be taken into account for public policy.
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Notes
1Here, we mean by political behaviour a behaviour relying on social preferences.
2This argument stems from self-attribution theory (Bem 1972) and is central to self-
signaling models in economics. In self-signaling models, agents derive utility from the outcome
of actions, outcome utility, but also derive diagnostic utility from the information that the
action provides on some underlying trait or disposition of themselves (see for instance Bodner
and Prelec 2001).
3In their real experiment, Freedman and Fraser (1966) telephoned housewives in Palo Alto,
California. They asked them if they would be willing to answer a few questions about the
kind of soaps they used. Two or three days later, the subjects were asked if they would agree
to have ﬁve or six men come to their house for two hours or so to classify the household
products they used. In the control group, only the second request was made. In the control
22.2% accepted, while with foot-in-the-door, 52.8% accepted.
4Long-term health eﬀects of air pollution data are derived from current air pollution in
Marseilles. Note also that our approach diﬀers from Alberini et al. (2004) and Krupnick
et al. (2002). When they present the new drug to respondents, they do not refer explicitly to
air pollution  the drug is only associated with a reduction in mortality risks. In that sense,
their approach is non-contextual.
5The scenario may also involve indirect beneﬁts to the extent to which relatives of the
subject can also beneﬁt from his or her better health.
6Air quality in Marseilles, the largest city in the area, was used as a referent for all
respondents.
7Here again, air quality in Marseilles was used as a referent.
8We chose to introduce the petition only on the second day in order not to contaminate the
sessions without the petition. Three other sessions related to other topics were implemented
in between.
9The presidential election was to be held 6 months later. At the time of the experiment,
a petition, promoted in the French media, was actually circulating in France. Our petition
was eﬀectively sent to each candidate.
10When we were unsure whether or not certain subjects had signed the petition, they were
identiﬁed later using the video system of the voting room.
11Information was presented simultaneously on individual screens and aloud to ensure that
all respondents had the same information. It was based on epidemiological data on long-term
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mortality and morbidity risks induced by air pollution (Künzli et al. 2000). In the move and
regulation scenarios, we also reminded subjects of the non-health eﬀects of air pollution.
12For instance: I do not agree with the principle of paying, I would not pay since I will
only move to live in the country, I do not agree to pay to move to a less polluted place when
I can die tomorrow crossing the street or I do not want to pay because the factories are the
major polluters).
13WTP statistics are computed using non-protest responses only.
14In the following, unconditional mean tests are two-sided.
15The model is estimated in Stata 9.0 and p-values are computed using the robust variance-
covariance matrix. Some observations are dropped from the analysis due to missing values,
mainly on income. We also estimate a Box-Cox linear model where the WTP is transformed
according to a Box-Cox transformation (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). Tests on the
estimated transformation parameter (θ = .0208) reject equality to one (p < .0001) or minus
one (p < .0001) but fail to reject nullity (p = .547), that is using the logarithm of the WTP.
In doing so, we however lose some observations, that is, true zero WTP, 11 observations
hence 2.72% of the sample. We also exclude protest responses (34 subjects  7.8% of the
total sample). As we only consider subjects who agreed to sign the petition (when given
the opportunity) and subjects who gave a strictly positive WTP, we also test for potential
selection biases that would undermine our previous results. We do so by estimating Heckman
selection models (Heckman 1979), ﬁrst considering the selection of subjects and then, in a
second equation, estimating the WTP model. We introduce into the selection equation the
same covariates as in the WTP equation (covariates in the WTP equation are kept the same).
Wald tests of independent equations show that there is no selection bias induced by protest
responses (p = .2972), nor for subjects who did not sign the petition (p = .923)  the joint
test is p = .491.
16Because the WTP equation is semilogarithmic, the percentage changes in WTP values
induced by the petition are computed as per Kennedy (1981).
17The subject is told that s/he has been randomly selected to make the decision for all
other participants.
18So called assymetric paternalists (see, for instance, Camerer et al. 2003) may not be
happy with this behavioural approach that induces people to make purchases without their
prior intention and hence would contest the validity of the consumer surplus' evaluation based
on those purchases. Arguing pro or contra assymetric paternalism however is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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A Scenario 1: Drug scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the
best decision for yourself and your household.
Let's imagine that the Ministry of Health has authorized a new drug, diﬀerent
from those currently available. It allows the long-term eﬀects of air pollution
exposure to be reduced by half. It simply involves taking a pill every month,
which, by the combined action of several vitamins, stimulates immunological
responses. It has no side eﬀects and no contra-indications. It can be taken by
any person who is more than 5 years old.
This new drug is reimbursed neither by the social security system nor by
the CMU (state means-tested health cover) nor by the complementary health
insurances policies. This implies that, if you choose to buy it, you will bear the
full cost. We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay to use
this drug, which would reduce by half the long-term diseases and mortality risks
associated with air pollution. Do not forget that this money will be drawn from
your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at the end of the
month for consumption or savings.
B Scenario 2: Move scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the
best decision for yourself and your household.
Let's imagine that you and your household have to move. You can choose
between two cities which are exactly equivalent in terms of inhabitants, work-
ing conditions, schools, climate, public services, cultural life, transport, housing,
surroundings, etc. There is only one diﬀerence between them: the level of atmo-
spheric pollution. The ﬁrst city - let's call it POL - is as polluted as Marseilles.
And the second city - let's call it LESSPOL - is half as polluted as Marseilles.
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The problem is that the cost of living is higher in LESSPOL (the less polluted
city): housing, local taxes, public transport, etc. are more expensive. This
means that if you choose to move to LESSPOL, you will have to pay more to
have the same standard of living as in POL.
We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for
you and your household to move to LESSPOL (the less polluted city) rather than
to POL (the town as polluted as Marseilles). Do not forget that this money will
be drawn from your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at
the end of the month for consumption and savings.
C Scenario 3: Regulation scenario
You are going to be the main actor in our scenario. You will have to take the
best decision for yourself and your household.
Let's imagine that new laws and rules are to be adopted to limit air pollu-
tion. Therefore industries, manufacturers of consumer products, public or pri-
vate transport, will have to adopt less polluting technologies. Studies have shown
that these new laws and rules will make it possible to reduce by half the number
of highly polluted days in the PACA region, and particularly in Marseilles.
The implementation of these new technologies will induce higher costs in
every-day life: energy, food and other goods, transport. This means that you
will have to pay more to enjoy the same standard of living as before the imple-
mentation of these new laws and rules.
We would like to know how much you would be willing to pay per month for
these new laws and rules to be implemented. Do not forget that this money will
be drawn from your household's budget! You will therefore have less money at
the end of the month for consumption and savings.
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D Petition
Soon, all the candidates for the next presidential election will be known. You
may know that for several days, since a few days, a petition has been circulat-
ing in France. The aim of this petition is to obtain a commitment from each
candidate, whatever his/her political background, to include the questions of en-
vironmental conservation in his/er program, because it is important that each
of us is able to make informed choices.
We need a lot of signatures. Therefore, if you think, like us, that issues
of environmental conservation are essential issues on which candidates for the
presidential election should take a clear stance, we invite you to sign this peti-
tion. Thank you.
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E Sample characteristics
Variable Description Mean (sd)
Male Subject is male (=1) .369 (.48)
log(Age) Logarithm of age of the subject (years) 3.612 (.35)
log(NPers) logarithm of number of persons .825 (.52)
in the household
log(Income) Logarithm of Monthly individual 7.042 (.89)
income (euros)
Bac Senior high school education .750 (.42)
level and higher (=1)
PrivHealthIns Subject has private health .819 (.39)
insurance (=1)
LiveMars Subject lives in Marseilles (=1) .762 (.43)
Owner Status of the occupant of the .461 (.50)
place of residence (=1)
Smoker Subject is a smoker (=1) .131 (.34)
KnowAir Subject declares a good .263 (.44)
knowledge of air pollution (=1)
KnowAtmo Subject knows the ATMO oﬃcial scale .217 (.41)
of air pollution levels (=1)
KnowAirmaraix Subject knows the AIRMARAIX local .263 (.44)
air pollution index (=1)
GoodQualiMars Subject says that the air quality in .054 (.23)
Marseilles is good or very good (=1)
NevSortWaste Subject never sorts his/er waste (=1) .200 (.39)
Hab Subject changes habits during .570 (.491)
highly polluted days (=1)
FreshAir Subject regularly goes to .825 (.37)
the countryside to breath pure air (=1)
GoodHealth Subject declares good or .713 (.44)
very good health (=1)
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
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